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a b s t r a c t
Objectives: All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes outlining the grounds
for terminating parental rights (TPR) in relation to child abuse and neglect. Although recent
research has found that parents with disabilities are not more likely to maltreat their chil-
dren than parentswithout disabilities (Glaun&Brown, 1999; Oyserman,Mowbray,Meares,
& Firminger, 2000), studies have found very high rates of TPR of parents with disabili-
ties (Accardo & Whitman, 1989). The objective of this study is to examine how states are
including disability in their TPR statutes.
Methods: This study used legal document analysis, consisting of a comprehensive Boolean
search of the state codes of the 50 states and District of Columbia (DC) relating to TPR, using
themost recent state code available on Lexis-Nexis in August 2005. TPR and related statutes
were searched for contemporary and historical disability related terms and their common
cognates, such as: “mental,” “disability,” “handicap,” and “incapacity.” Two researchers
independently conducted the searches, and the searches were reconciled. A code list was
then developed to measure for inclusion of disability, preciseness, scope, use of language,
and references to accessibility or fairness. Statutes were then reanalyzed, and groupings
developed.
Results: Thirty-seven states included disability-related grounds for termination of parental
rights, while 14 states did not include disability language as grounds for termination. Many
of these state codes used outdated terminology, imprecise deﬁnitions, and emphasized
disability status rather than behavior. All of the 14 states that do not include disability in
TPR grounds allowed for termination based on neglectful parental behavior that may be
inﬂuenced by a disability.
Conclusions: The use of disability language in TPR statutes can put an undue focus on the
condition of having a disability, rather than parenting behavior.
Implications: This paper recommends that states consider removing disability language
from their statutes, as such language risks taking the emphasis away from the assessment
based on parenting behavior.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Historically, social policyhas regulated theparenting activities of peoplewithdisabilities in several differentways, includ-
ing forced sterilization, institutionalization, and termination of parental rights. The overall policy landscape has changed
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for people with disabilities in many ways, and people with disabilities are more included in school, work, and commu-
nity settings. The federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibit state and
local governments from discriminating against people with disabilities in their programs and services. However, these anti-
discrimination laws do not cover child custody and child protection proceedings, and parents with disabilities still face
discrimination in these arenas.
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes outlining the grounds for terminating parental rights (TPR) in
relation to child abuse and neglect. However, TPR and parents with disabilities are, in general, a neglected area of study and
research. Although recent research has found that parentswith disabilities are notmore likely tomaltreat their children than
parents without disabilities (Glaun & Brown, 1999; Oyserman, Mowbray, Meares, & Firminger, 2000), evidence shows that
courts have terminated parental rights based on an emphasis on a parent’s disability (Accardo & Whitman, 1989; Sackett,
1991; Watkins, 1995).
While a cursory analysis shows that many states include parental disability as statutory grounds for TPR (National
Clearinghouse for Child Abuse and Neglect, 2002), there has been no formal analysis of the inclusion of disability as grounds
for TPR in state codes. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine how states are including disability in their TPR statutes,
to identify state legislative innovations related to parents with disabilities, and to offer legislative change strategies for
states considering updating child custody codes related to parents with disabilities. While this study examines state TPR
statutes from a broad view of disability, much of the supporting literature is speciﬁc to parents with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities.
Background
As social attitudes and practices towards people with disabilities have evolved from institutionalization and compulsory
sterilization to a community-based approach, the numbers of parents with disabilities have increased (Dowdney & Skuse,
1993; Llewellyn, 1990; Swain & Cameron, 2003; Tymchuck, Llewellyn, & Feldman, 1999). While their numbers have clearly
grown, there are few accurate sources of information on the prevalence of parents with disabilities. Reasons for this lack
of information include the lack of universally accepted deﬁnition of disability and the lack of administrative and research
data on parents with disabilities (Llewellyn, 1990; McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Sackett, 1991). The best estimate of the
USA population of parents with disabilities comes from the National Health and Information Survey’s 1994/1995 Disability
Supplement’s data on mothers of 1 or more children under the age of 18. Using this data, Anderson, Byun, Larson, and Lakin
(2005) found that therewere approximately 175,000motherswith intellectual and/or developmental disabilities, and about
1.35 million mothers with signiﬁcant functional limitations but not intellectual or developmental disabilities.
Despite these increasing numbers, people with disabilities often struggle with family, community, and social ambiva-
lence about their becoming parents (Ackerson, 2003; Llewellyn, 1990). Parents with disabilities face social stereotypes and
prejudicial presumptions that they will inevitably maltreat their children or put them at risk from others, or that they have
irremediable parenting deﬁciencies that put their children at risk and risk their developmental outcomes (Ackerson, 2003;
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Sackett, 1991). Many child welfare protocols indicate that a parental disability is a high risk
for abuse so parents with disabilities may experience higher scrutiny from child protection agencies.
Currently no national studies of the number of parents with disabilities who have been involved in the child welfare
system exist. Most child welfare agencies do not collect data on parents with disabilities; therefore, information available is
fromvery small studies or anecdotal information. There have been estimates that between40% and60%of children of parents
with intellectual disabilities have been removed from the home (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Studies of child protection
court proceedings have found that parents with disabilities are often disproportionately involved in the child protection
system (Glaun & Brown, 1999; Swain & Cameron, 2003; Taylor et al., 1991). Parents with disabilities who are involved with
the child protection system aremore likely to be facing allegations of neglect than of abuse or risk of abuse (Collentine, 2005;
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Swain and Cameron (2003) examined the perceptions of the court system among parents
with disabilities and found that parents with disabilities reported that they suffer prejudicial or discriminatory treatment
from child protection and the courts. Glaun and Brown (1999) characterized the court’s approach to child protection with
parents with disabilities as one of “risk management,” where the children’s rights are balanced against the rights of the
parents.
Parents with certain types of disabilities, such as intellectual disabilities, are likely to have other risk factors that trigger
their involvement with child welfare (Dowdney & Skuse, 1993; McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Parents with intellectual
disabilities often come from families that have experienced poverty and social exclusion (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002;
Swain & Cameron, 2003). Many parents with intellectual disabilities have reported being abused or neglected themselves,
social isolation, little extended family support, meager incomes, and welfare dependence (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002;
Tymchuck et al., 1999). Parents with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities are not the only parents with disabilities
being observed in relation to risks for child maltreatment. In their study on parental ﬁtness of people with psychiatric
diagnoses, Benjet, Azar, and Kuersten-Hogan (2003) found that mental illness as predictor of abuse is less signiﬁcant than
other perpetrator characteristics, such as poverty, stress, history of abuse, and social isolation. Unfortunately, as Swain and
Cameron (2003) found, “. . .disability tends to be seen as the principle determinant of inability to care for children, butwhere
poverty, housing issues, and the like are also present, these are seen as further conﬁrmation of parental inadequacy” (p. 167).
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Despite disproportionately greater involvement in the child welfare system, a growing body of research on the outcomes
for children of parents with disabilities does not necessarily support the assumption that parents with disabilities are more
likely to abuse or neglect their children. Studies have found that children of parents with intellectual disabilities can have
successful outcomes (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Other studies have indicated that it is impossible to predict parenting
outcomes based on the results of intelligence testing (Dowdney & Skuse, 1993). However, laws addressing parents with
disabilities have tended to focus on disability in a categorical fashion rather than looking at individual parenting behaviors
or abilities.
The legal status of parents with disabilities
The USA legal system has been involved in regulating parenting activities since the 19th century, including efforts to
regulate fertility and to protect children. Sterilization of people with disabilities was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in 1927, and subsequent court decisions have continued to classify mental retardation or developmental disability as
a legal condition that may require speciﬁc guidance or limitations (Watkins, 1995).
Since themid to late 19th century, states have taken legal steps to protect the rights of children (Sackett, 1991). As early as
1851, state laws provided that the courtsmay “. . .in their sound discretion, andwhen themorals, or safety, or interests of the
children strongly require it, withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or mother, and place the care and custody
of them elsewhere” (Kent, 1851, p. 211). All states adopted versions of child welfare laws, which protect children via many
interventions ranging from temporary removal from parental custody to TPR. When a parent’s rights are terminated, there
is a severance of the legal relationship between the parent and child and, generally, a permanent separation of the parent
from the child (Sackett, 1991). A 1982 Supreme Court decision, Santosky vs. Kramer, found that courts could not terminate
parental rights based on presumptions of “ascribed status,” in this case a father’s unwed status, but through individual
inquiry regarding the speciﬁc person’s ability to parent their child effectively (Watkins, 1995).
In aneffort to createmoreuniformprotections for children,model statute language for TPRwasproposedby theNeglected
Children Committee of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges in 1976 (Lincoln, 1976). It was written as a model that
state legislatures could adopt or adapt to improve their current statutes (Lincoln, 1976). The model language states that
state courts may terminate parental rights when the Court:
. . .ﬁnds the parent unﬁt or that the conduct or condition of the parent is such as to render him/her unable to properly
care for the child and that such conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. In determining
unﬁtness, conduct, or condition, the Court shall consider, but is not limited to the following: . . .Emotional illness,
mental illness or mental deﬁciency of the parent of such duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely to care
for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child (Lincoln, 1976, p. 7).
Many states adopted this language verbatim into their child welfare statutes.
Statutes that include disability as grounds for termination may lead to the presumption that disability is equivalent to
parental unﬁtness, justifying state intervention (Watkins, 1995). Presumptions of unﬁtness to parent often lead to parents
losing custody of their children before birth under a theory of prospective neglect (Collentine, 2005; Watkins, 1995). Court
studies have found that “. . .the presumption of incompetence evoked by the diagnosis of intellectual disability is so inﬂu-
ential that evidence challenging it may not be readily accepted” (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002, p. 309). Parenting abilities
of parents with disabilities are often ignored in favor of presumptions about the parenting abilities of all people with dis-
abilities. For example, Watkins (1995) documents cases in Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and New York where courts
have made decisions to terminate parental rights for people with disabilities based on expert testimony focusing on pre-
sumptions of unﬁtness by parents with disabilities based on the characteristics about people with certain disability labels,
rather than observation of individual parenting abilities [In re Karen Y., 550 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Orangeburg
County Department of Social Services v. Harley, 393 S.E. 2d 597.2d 597 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990); 563 N.E.2d 1200 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); C.L.R. v. Russo, 567 So. 2d 703 (La. Ct. App. 1990)]. Further, Watkins (1995) documents how parents with disabilities
have often lost their parental rights upon the birth of their children or after they had not been provided with appropriate
reuniﬁcation services. Challenges to current state statutes that include a parent’s disability status have beenmade citing the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Sackett, 1991) and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Watkins, 1995). To date, none of these challenges has been successful.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), designed in part to shorten the stay of abused or neglected children in
foster care, has mandated that state courts become evenmore involved in TPR. ASFA required TPR in cases where a child has
been in foster care 15 of the most recent 22 months, when a child has been abandoned, or when a parent has committed or
been involved in murder, voluntary manslaughter, or felonious assaults of one of their children. Since 1997, all states have
added the ASFA requirement to their state codes (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002).
In addition to the ASFA related TPR grounds, most states have additional grounds for terminating parental rights, some
which date back many decades. States vary in their non-ASFA related grounds with some having extensive and explicit lists
of grounds for termination and others having very limited and/or very broad grounds for termination. Examples of other
common grounds include chronic substance abuse, failure to maintain contact with a child, or failure to maintain support
of a child (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002).
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At the time of the adoption of ASFA, a national taskforce reminiscent of the Neglected Children Committee of 1976 was
formed called Adoption 2002: The President’s Initiative on Adoption and Foster Care. In 1997, Adoption 2002 released its
Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children (National Clearinghouse on Child
Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002). These guidelines were being developed simultaneously to the adoption of the ASFA
legislation and, thus, include many recommendations to states related to the new emphasis on permanency for children.
Strikingly similar to the 1976 Committee, the Adoption 2002 Initiative again included a recommendation that states include
parental incapacity in TPR statutes (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002).
While parental incapacity can be deﬁned in a number of ways, it is often deﬁned to include a parent’s disability (National
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002). Adoption 2002 speciﬁcally states that:
many [state codes] do not make it clear that, in some cases, sufﬁcient evidence of parental incapacity is enough to
establish grounds for termination (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002).
Thus, these recommendations appear to still promote TPR based either partially or primarily on a disability in instances
when parents’ incapacity is a disability.
The purpose of this study is to ascertain the current legislative status of parentswith disabilitieswithin state TPR statutes.
Although statesmay have policy directives (i.e., agency practices), which provide alternative guidance for decision outcomes
for parents with disabilities, state statutes remain at the crux of the issue. Since more and more parents with disabilities of
all types are having children, it is important to understand the extent to which states focus on parental disability within TPR
statues and the nature of the discussion of parental disability.
Methodology
This study used legal document analysis consisting of a comprehensive Boolean search of the state codes of the 50 states
and District of Columbia relating to TPR using the most recent state code available on Lexis-Nexis in August 2005. TPR and
related statutes were searched for contemporary and historical terms related to disability and their common cognates, such
as: disability, mental, handicap, disorder, and incapacity. When language surrounding disability was found in codes relating
to child welfare, this language was then searched throughout the entire state code to see how these terms were deﬁned
elsewhere. For example, if “emotional illness” was used in the TPR code of a certain state, the entire state code was searched
for a deﬁnition of “emotional illness.” Further, deﬁnitions for child welfare terms such as “unﬁt parent” and “best interest
of the child” were explored to see if these were statutorily deﬁned elsewhere as speciﬁcally including or excluding parental
disability. Two researchers independently conducted the searches, and the searches were reconciled by going over ﬁndings
on a state-by-state basis. A code list was then developed to measure for preciseness, scope, use of language, and references
to accessibility or fairness, and statutes were reanalyzed, and groupings developed.
Results
Parental disability in state TPR statutes
The majority of states include parent’s disability in their codes as grounds for TPR if a disability impacts a parent’s ability
to care for his or her child or as a condition to take into consideration when determining whether a person is unﬁt to parent.
As of August 2005, 37 states included disability-related grounds for TPR while 14 states did not include disability language
as grounds for termination. The vast majority of these state statutes related to parental disability use outdated terminology,
have imprecise deﬁnitions of disability, and emphasize conditions rather than behaviors.
All of the states that includedisability in their grounds for termination specify explicit typesofdisabilities for courts to con-
sider. Currently, 36 states have speciﬁc grounds formental illness, 32 have speciﬁc grounds for intellectual or developmental
disability, 18 have grounds for emotional illness, and 7 have grounds of physical disability (see Table 1
). Two states, Missouri and Tennessee, also use the generic mental condition, which can imply a mental illness or an
intellectual or developmental disability. North Carolina is the only state that also speciﬁes organic brain syndrome as a
speciﬁc disability to consider when terminating parental rights. Eleven states use a common combination of disability types,
“emotional illness, mental illness and mental deﬁciency,” that came directly from the Neglected Children Committee of the
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges of 1976.
Outdated terminology and imprecise deﬁnitions
The vast majority of the state codes relating to terminating parental rights use outdated terminology when discussing a
parent’s disability. Many codes use language from the 1940s and 1950s. This archaic language does not easily translate to
contemporary legal,medical, or social deﬁnitions of disability. Further,many people in theUSA consider the type of language
contained in the state statutes to be offensive.
An example of the outdated language seen in the state codes is in reference to parents with intellectual or developmental
disabilities. Thirty-two state codes include a reference to a disability that inmodern terminologywould consist of an intellec-
tual or developmental disability (I/DD). However, the term intellectual disability is never used, and developmental disability
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Table 1
Disability language in state termination of parental rights statutes.
State Disability
included in
TPR
grounds
Intellectual
or develop-
mental
disabilities
in TPR
grounds
Mental
illness in
TPR
grounds
Emotional
illness in
TPR
grounds
Physical
disability in
TPR
grounds
Other
disability in
TPR
grounds
Disability language used within
statutes
Alabama Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Alaska Yes X X X Mental illness, serious emotional
disturbance, mental deﬁciency
Arizona Yes X X Mental illness, mental deﬁciency
Arkansas Yes X X X Mental illness, emotional illness,
mental deﬁciencies
California Yes X X Developmentally disabled,
mentally ill, mentally disabled,
mental incapacity’ mental disorder
Colorado Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Connecticut No
Delaware Yes X X Mental illness, psychopathology,
mental retardation, mental
deﬁciency
District of
Columbia
Yes X X X Physical, mental and emotional
health
Florida No
Georgia Yes X X X Medically veriﬁable deﬁciency of
the parent’s physical, mental, or
emotional health
Hawaii Yes X X Mentally ill, mentally retarded
Idaho No
Illinois Yes X X X Mental impairment, mental illness,
mental retardation, developmental
disability
Indiana No
Iowa Yes X Chronic mental illness and has
been repeatedly institutionalized
Kansas Yes X X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency, physical
disability
Kentucky Yes X X Mental illness, mental retardation
Louisiana No
Maine No
Maryland Yes X X Mental disorder, mental
retardation
Massachusetts Yes X X Mental deﬁciency, mental illness
Michigan No
Minnesota No
Mississippi Yes X X Severe mental deﬁciencies,
extreme physical incapacitation
Missouri Yes X Mental condition (undeﬁned)
Montana Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Nebraska Yes X X Mental illness, mental deﬁciency
Nevada Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
New
Hampshire
Yes X X Mental deﬁciency, mental illness
New Jersey No
New Mexico Yes X X X X Physical disorder or incapacity,
mental disorder or incapacity,
hospitalization
New York Yes X X Mental illness, mental retardation
North
Carolina
Yes X X X Mental retardation, mental illness,
organic brain syndrome
North Dakota Yes X X X X Physical illness or disability,
mental illness or disability,
emotional illness or disability
other illness or disability
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Table 1 (Continued )
State Disability
included in
TPR
grounds
Intellectual
or develop-
mental
disabilities
in TPR
grounds
Mental
illness in
TPR
grounds
Emotional
illness in
TPR
grounds
Physical
disability in
TPR
grounds
Other
disability in
TPR
grounds
Disability language used within
statutes
Ohio Yes X X X X Chronic mental illness, chronic
emotional illness’ mental
retardation physical disability
Oklahoma Yes X X Mental illness, mental deﬁciency
Oregon Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Pennsylvania No
Rhode Island No
South
Carolina
Yes X X X Mental deﬁciency, mental illness,
extreme physical incapacity
South Dakota No
Tennessee Yes X X Mental condition, mental and
emotional status
Texas Yes X X X Mental or emotional illness,
mental deﬁciency
Utah Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Vermont No
Virginia Yes X X X Mental or emotional illness,
Mental deﬁciency
Washington Yes X X Psychological incapacity, mental
deﬁciency
West Virginia Yes X X X Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deﬁciency
Wisconsin Yes X X X Presently, and for at least two of
the previous ﬁve years, has been an
inpatient at a hospital, licensed
treatment facility or state
treatment facility due to mental
illness of developmental disability
Wyoming No
Totals Yes: 37
No: 14
is only used by 3 states. The most commonly used description of I/DD in statutes is “mental deﬁciency,” used by 21 states.
The termmental deﬁciency was in common usage in the USA from the 1940s through the 1960s with the main professional
association called the American Association onMental Deﬁciency through the 1970s. However, this term fell out of favor and
by the 1970s was replaced by the termmental retardation. Now both terms are considered pejorative with many advocates
and researchers recently adopting the term intellectual disability as amore respectful term formental retardation. The term
developmental disability is a broader term thanmental retardation and includes other types of disabilities occurring during
the developmental period, such as cerebral palsy, that may not involve an intellectual disability.
The states using the more modern terms developmental disabilities or mental retardation in their TPR statutes tend to
have muchmore precise deﬁnitions of the disability. All 3 of the states using the term developmental disabilities relied on a
state deﬁnition of developmental disabilities, which generally mirrors the federal deﬁnition. Likewise, most of the 8 states
that use the term mental retardation or mentally retarded have a precise deﬁnition of mental retardation that is similar to
standard diagnostic usage. Twenty-one states use the very outdated term “mental deﬁciency” with no state deﬁnition of
mental deﬁciency anywhere within their state code. As there is no modern deﬁnition of this term, courts have to rely on
precedent that may be well out of date.
Similarly, 18 states include a reference to emotional disability with 13 referring to it as emotional illness, 2 as emotional
health, and 1 each as emotional disability, emotional disturbance, and emotional status. Like the term mental deﬁciency,
the term emotional illness does not have an agreed upon current deﬁnition by medical, psychological, or advocacy groups.
While the term emotional disturbance is often used in reference to children who have functional impairments, it does not
refer to a particular diagnosis andmost often is used for people under age 18 (US Department of Health and Human Services,
1999). Emotional illness was not deﬁned in any of the state codes except to say that it must not be transitory. In a number
of states, the only place the term emotional illness is used in the entire state code is in the child welfare statutes.
Likewise, while mental illness is the most commonly included disability in TPR statutes, many states either have no
deﬁnition of their terminology related to mental illness, or else a very broad deﬁnition of mental illness. For example,
Colorado’s code allows for TPR if there exists clear and convincing evidence of “emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deﬁciency of the parent of such duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely within a reasonable time to care for the
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ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs and conditions of the child” [C.R.S. 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) (2004)]. There is no
deﬁnition of mental illness provided in the particular section of the code nor is there direction given as to an appropriate
deﬁnition that may be present in other parts of the code. Other states have mental illness more explicitly deﬁned, generally
by using a general state deﬁnition of the term.
Several states have more narrowly deﬁned deﬁnitions of how mental illness can be used for terminating parental rights,
usually including severity and/or chronicity. For example, Iowa’s state code speciﬁes that parental rights may be terminated
if a parent has a chronic mental illness, has been repeatedly institutionalized, and presents a danger to his or herself or
others [Iowa Code § 232.116 (2004)]. Similarly, Wisconsin limits the use of mental illness as grounds for termination solely
for individuals who are currently hospitalized and have been hospitalized for 2 of the previous 5 years [Wis. Stat. § 48.415
(2004)].
Focus on conditions rather than behaviors
Amajor concernabout the inclusionof disability in thegrounds for TPR is that it can shift the focus fromaparent’s behavior
to aparent’s condition.Almost all of thenon-disability relatedgrounds for TPRarebasedonparent’s past or currentbehaviors,
such as neglect, abuse, or abandonment. While no states have criteria indicating that having a disability is, by itself, grounds
for termination, it is one of the only grounds for termination based on a contributing factor to a parent’s behavior rather
than the parent’s behavior itself. By contrast, of the many states that include failing to ﬁnancially support a child as means
for termination, none lists the causes of lack of ﬁnancial support in their statutes, such as chronic unemployment or lack of
a high school diploma.
Currently, there are 14 states that do not refer to a parent’s disability in their state TPR statutes. All of these states include
language in their codes allowing states to terminate parental rights based on abusive or neglectful behavior of a parent that
may be inﬂuenced by his or her disability. However, with disability not included in the state statute, the focus necessarily
has to be more on the individual’s behavior rather than the individual’s condition.
Discussion
The ﬁndings from this study show that many states include disability in their TPR related statutes. While including
disability language in TPR statutes does not mean that all or even most parents with disabilities are at risk for having their
children removed if they come in contact with the court system, it does point to a risk that parents with disabilities may
face. While no state focused solely on disability as a cause for TPR and many courts in states that include disability in their
state code have concluded that disability alone is not a sufﬁcient basis to terminate parental rights [In re Michael B., 604
N.W. 2d 405, 412 (Neb. 2000)], there is a chance that the child protection system will put a heavier emphasis on disability
if it is included in the state statute.
The inclusion of disability within state statutes is different from many of the other grounds for TPR required by ASFA.
When disability is included in a state statute, it can place the emphasis on the mental or physical diagnosis of the parent
rather than the ability for a parent to nurture and provide a safe environment for his or her child. While most professionals
involved in the child welfare system might remain focused on parenting, it could become more difﬁcult when the court
proceedings place an emphasis on the diagnosis rather than speciﬁc parental behavior.
From this study, it appears that many states that include disability do so in an inappropriate manner using outdated
terminology to refer to a person’s disability, or using imprecise deﬁnitions of disability. Terms such as emotional illness,
mental illness, or mental deﬁciency are vague. Such vaguely worded state statutes tie disability with a parent’s inability
to care for the child but are not speciﬁc in what this means or how child protection and the courts should interpret the
statutes (Collentine, 2005). The advantage of vague language is that it allows child protection authorities and the courts
ﬂexibility to adapt interventions and ﬁndings to best meet the speciﬁc needs of each case. However, vague laws can also
lead to imbalanced interpretation and enforcement, as previous court studies have found (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Of
the states that do not include disability-related language in their TPR statues, all had general provisions that would allow
TPR of parents with disabilities though such a TPR would focus on the individual’s parental behavior rather than disability
status.
As a result of this review of state statues and the potential for discrimination, there is clearly a need for child welfare
agencies to review their terminology concerned disabilities, especially relating to TPR, and perhaps change their statutes
to deemphasize the disability of the parent and refocus on behavior. Indeed, there is evidence that states are interested in
this change. Rhode Island and Idaho have recently changed the language about disability within their state TPR statutes. The
rationale in both states was that the disability language was unnecessary and could result in unequal treatment in the state
courts for peoplewith disabilities. In Idaho, the state not only eliminated the disability language but also inserted protections
for people with disabilities, and inserted a provision in child protection and adoption statutes that parents with disabilities
have the opportunity to show how their use of adaptive equipment can aid in their parenting (Lightfoot, LaLiberte, & Hill,
2007; Idaho Code §16-1501b; Idaho Code §16-1506: Idaho Code §16-1601-1643; Idaho Code §16-2001-2015; & Idaho Code
§32-1005).
While this study provides a comprehensive overviewof the extent towhich state TPR statutes include disability language,
it is limited in severalways. First, this studyonly focuseson the state codesanddoesnotexaminehowparentswithdisabilities
934 E. Lightfoot et al. / Child Abuse & Neglect 34 (2010) 927–934
have fared under state codes that include or do not include disability language. Thus, this study does not examine the link
between state codes and the decision-making processes of the child welfare and court systems nor does it examine the
link between the codes and the decision outcomes. Second, while court records in most states were studied as background
information for this project, there was no systematic attempt to see how courts were interpreting state statutes. Certainly,
the language in a state statute is only one ofmany factors that can inﬂuence the termination of parental rights, and this study
does not examine the broader array of inﬂuences. Future research in this area could explore further the relationship between
these varied inﬂuences including examining how the various actors in the TPR process view parents with disabilities, and
what types of guidance, such as state statutes, policy directives, professional experience, personal knowledge, evidence-
base, they rely on when making decisions. Likewise, more inquiry is needed into how parents with disabilities fare when
encountering the child welfare system with attention placed on both child and parent outcomes.
Conclusion
Many state statutes continue to institutionalize discriminatory language regarding disability and, therefore, potentially
enable discriminatory practices that could cause unnecessary concerns about the safety of children andunnecessarily disrupt
their permanence andwell-being.Whilemany state court decisions have clearly ruled that disability alone is not a sufﬁcient
basis to terminate parental rights, previous research has also found that parents with disabilities are often at a disadvantage
in court proceedings surrounding the custody of their children (Collentine, 2005; McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Swain &
Cameron, 2003), which may be due in part to the vague language and guidance provided by state statutes. Clearly, parents
with disabilities should be evaluated based on their ability to parent rather than on a categorical decision based on a
permanent condition.While some peoplewith disabilitiesmay have disability-related factors limiting their ability to parent,
others with disabilities may not. There certainly is a possibility that individual worker decisions, state or county policy
directives, or judicial decision-making have more of an impact than the language in the state laws, but state TPR laws do
provide the guidelines for the actors within the system.
States should review their child welfare statutes for terminology concerning disabilities in their assessment and other
processes, not solely regarding termination of parental rights. During this review, some states may ﬁnd that they indeed
need to clearly emphasize behavior rather than the condition of the parent in their state statues, and states may want to
consider removing disability language from these state statutes. States that include language focusing on the condition of
having a disability risk taking the emphasis away from the parenting behavior. Considering that states which do not have
disability listed within their statutes are still able to terminate parental rights based on abuse or neglect, there appears to
be no compelling reason to include disability within the statutes.
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